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ABSTRACT
This paper is a quantitatively-oriented theoretical study into the
interaction between housing prices, aggregate production, and household
behaviour over a lifetime. We develop a life-cycle model of a production
economy in which land and capital are used to build residential and
commercial structures. We find that, in an economy where the share of
land in the value of structures is large, housing prices react more to an
exogenous change in expected productivity or the world interest rate,
causing large redistribution effects between net buyers and net sellers of
houses. Changing the financing constraint, however, has limited effects on
housing prices.
JEL Classification: E21.
Key Words: Real estates, Land, Housing Prices, Life cycle, Collateral
constraints.
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This paper is a quantitatively-oriented theoretical study into the interaction between
housing prices, aggregate production, and household behavior over a lifetime. We develop
a life-cycle model of a production economy in which land and capital are used to build
residential and commercial structures. We ￿nd that, in an economy where the share of
land in the value of structures is large, housing prices react more to an exogenous change in
expected productivity or the world interest rate, causing large redistribution e⁄ects between
net buyers and net sellers of houses. Changing the ￿nancing constraint, however, has limited
e⁄ects on housing prices.
JEL Classi￿cation: E21.
Key Words: Real estates, Land, Housing Prices, Life cycle, Collateral constraints.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, we observe considerable ￿ uctuations in real estate values and
aggregate economic activities in many economies. In Japan, both the real capital gains on
real estate during the prosperous decade of the 1980s and the losses during the depressed
decades of the 1990s and the early 2000s are in the order of multiple years worth of GDP.
Recent ￿ uctuations in housing prices in many countries raise concerns. To what extent
are these housing price ￿ uctuations consistent with fundamental conditions? How does the
￿ uctuation a⁄ect welfare of di⁄erent groups of households? In this paper, we develop a life-
cycle model to investigate how housing prices, aggregate production and wealth distribution
react to changes in technology and ￿nancial conditions. By checking whether the model is
broadly consistent with the life-cycle of home ownership and consumption, we use the model
to access which groups of households gain and which groups loose from the changes in the
fundamentals.
To develop a theoretical framework, we take into account the limitation on the supply of
land and the limitation on contract enforcement in real estate and credit markets. Land (or
location) is an important input for producing residential and commercial structures. Because
the supply of land is largely inelastic and because the price of structures includes the value of
land, the price of structures is sensitive to a change in the expected productivity growth rate
and the real interest rate in equilibrium. We also consider incomplete contract enforcement
to be an essential feature of the economy with real estate. Often, because landlords are
afraid that the tenant may modify the property against their interests (or disputes may
arise over splitting the modi￿cation costs), landlords restrict tenants￿discretion over the
use and modi￿cation of the house, and tenants enjoy lower utility from renting the house
compared to owning and controlling the same house. If there were no other frictions, then
the household would buy the house straight away. The household, however, may face a
￿nancing constraint, because the creditor fears that the borrowing household may default.
The creditor demands the borrower to put his house as collateral for a loan and asks him to
provide a downpayment from his own net worth.
In this paper, we take the importance of land for production of structures, the loss of util-
1ity from rented housing and the tightness of collateral constraints as exogenous parameters,
and examine how they a⁄ect household consumption and housing over the lifetime, housing
prices and aggregate quantities.1 For this purpose, we develop an overlapping generations
model of a production economy in which land and capital are used to produce residential
and commercial structures. We are also interested in the way households cope with idiosyn-
cratic and uninsurable shocks to their labor income, which helps to generate realistic housing
choices and wealth distribution outcomes.
The interaction between the collateral constraint and the loss of utility from renting a
house turns out to generate a typical pattern of consumption and housing over a life-cycle.
When the household is born without any inheritance, it cannot a⁄ord a su¢ ciently high
downpayment for buying a house; the household rents and consumes modestly to save for a
downpayment. When some net worth has been accumulated, the household buys a house
subject to the collateral constraint, which is smaller than a house that would be bought
without the collateral constraint. As net worth further rises, the household upgrades along
the housing ladder with the collateral constraint continuing to be binding. At some stage,
the household ￿nds it better to start repaying the debt rather than maximizing the size of
the house. When the time comes for retirement, possibly with idiosyncratic risk attached,
the household moves to a smaller house, anticipating a lower income in the future.2
In equilibrium, due to the limitation of land supply, the supply of structures tends to
grow more slowly than ￿nal output causing an upward trend in the real rental price and the
purchase price of structures. The more important is land for producing structures compared
to capital, the higher is the expected growth rate of the rental price, and therefore the higher
is the housing price-rental ratio.2 This is true for a country like Japan or a metropolitan
area. In such an economy, the household needs a larger downpayment relative to wage
income in order to buy a house, and tends to buy a house later in life, resulting in a lower
home-ownership rate.
1Here, the importance of land for production of structures is de￿ned as the elasticity of structure supply
with respect to land for a ￿xed level of the other input. See equation (2) later.
2The price-rental ratio is an increasing function of the importance of land, also because the e⁄ective
depreciation rate of structures is a decreasing function of the importance of land (which does not depreciate).
2Moreover, in an economy where land is more important for producing structures com-
pared to capital, we ￿nd the housing price to be more sensitive to exogenous changes in the
fundamentals such as the expected growth rate of labor productivity or the world interest
rate, along the perfect foresight path from one steady state to another. Del Negro and Otrok
(2007) ￿nd empirical evidence that is consistent with this prediction: using a factor decom-
position of recent house price changes in the U.S., they attribute a higher percentage change
to local factors in states where the share of land in the real estate value is larger.3
In contrast to the change in productivity growth and the world interest rate, we ￿nd that
￿nancial innovation which permanently relaxes the collateral constraint has a surprisingly
small e⁄ect on housing prices, despite increasing the home-ownership rate substantially both
in the transition and in the steady state. In our economy, tenants or credit-constrained
home owners are relatively poor and own a small share of aggregate wealth as a group. As
a result, the e⁄ect of relaxing the collateral constraint on housing prices is largely absorbed
by a modest conversion from rented units to owned units.4
In addition to the e⁄ect on the housing price and aggregate output, the exogenous changes
in the productivity growth rate and the interest rate a⁄ect the welfare of various households
di⁄erently, causing winners and losers in housing markets. This distribution e⁄ect on wealth
and welfare is substantial, since housing wealth forms the largest component of nonhuman
wealth for most households. As a general rule of thumb, net house buyers (such as young
worker-tenants) lose while net house sellers (such as retiree-home owners) gain from the house
3Davis and Palumbo (2007) ￿nd that the share of land in the value of houses has risen in U.S. metropolitan
areas and they argue that this contributes to faster housing price appreciation and, possibly, larger swings in
housing prices. Glaeser et. al. (2005) ￿nd that land use restrictions are needed to explain recent high housing
prices in Manhattan. van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2006) also argue that the increase in the dispersion of
housing prices across regions can be quantitatively generated from an increase in the dispersion of earnings
in the presence of planning restrictions. We ignore the restrictions on land use and planning, even though
they further increase the natural limitation of land in supplying structures. Other factors that might be
empirically relevant for house price determination (such as owner-occupied housing as a hedge against rent
risk, the e⁄ects of in￿ ation and money illusion) are not considered in our framework; see Sinai and Souleles
(2005) and Brunnermeier and Julliard (2007).
4This is di⁄erent from Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) who show that relaxing the collateral constraint
increases housing prices substantially. We will later discuss further why our results di⁄er from theirs.
3price hike.5 The gap in welfare changes between winners and losers in the housing market
is larger in an economy where land is more important for producing structures compared
to capital, since in such an economy housing prices react more in response to an identical
shock.
Our work broadly follows two strands of the literature. One is the literature on consump-
tion and saving of a household who faces an idiosyncratic and uninsurable earnings shock
and a borrowing constraint, which includes Bewley (1977), Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997),
Attanasio et. al. (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002). Huggett (1993), Aiyagari
(1994), and Krusell and Smith (1998) have examined the general equilibrium implications of
such models. The second strand is the literature on the investment behavior of ￿rms under
liquidity constraints. In particular, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is closely related since they
study the dynamic interaction between asset prices, credit limits and aggregate economic
activity for an economy with credit constrained entrepreneurs. When many households bor-
row substantially against their housing collateral and move up and down along the housing
ladder, these households are more like small entrepreneurs rather than simple consumers.
Our attention to housing collateral is in line with substantial micro evidence in the UK
(Campbell and Cocco (2004)) and the US (Hurst and Sta⁄ord (2004)) which suggests that
dwellings are an important source of collateral for households. Given the empirical ￿nd-
ings that connect housing prices, home equity and aggregate consumption, there has been
substantial research on building models that capture these relationships, either with a repre-
sentative agent (Aoki et. al. (2004), Davis and Heathcote (2005) and Kahn (2007)), or with
heterogeneous agents (Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger
5The household is a net house seller, if the present value of housing services supplied by the owned house
is larger than the present value of housing services consumed. The present living population as a whole
is a net seller of the existing houses to the future population (that is not born yet). But, the value of
this aggregate net selling position is quantitatively very small, because the discounted value of selling the
existing houses to the next unborn population in 70 to 80 years from now is negligible. In comparison, the
redistribution within the present population between young and old, or between tenants and home owners,
is much larger. Thus, unlike popular arguments, the wealth e⁄ect of housing price on aggregate consumption
is negligible, because the positive wealth e⁄ect of the net house sellers is largely o⁄set by the negative wealth
e⁄ect of the net house buyers.
4(2001, 2006), Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2004), Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and
Neri (2007), Nakajima (2005) and Rios-Rull and Sanchez (2005), Silos (2007)). Distinguish-
ing features of our analysis include an investigation of the interaction between household
life-cycle choices and the aggregate economy, an explicit account of the role of land as a lim-
iting factor in a production economy and evaluating welfare changes across heterogeneous
households stemming from shocks to fundamentals.
Section 2 lays out the model and section 3 presents long-run observations relevant for
housing markets. Section 4 investigates the individual and aggregate predictions of the
model using calibration, Section 5 performs the welfare evaluations and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Framework
We consider an economy with homogeneous product, structures and labor, and homogeneous
reproducible capital stock and non-reproducible land. There is a continuum of heterogeneous
households of population size Nt in period t, a representative foreigner, and a representative
￿rm.
The representative ￿rm has a constant returns to scale production technology to produce
output (Yt) from labor (Nt) and productive structures (ZY t) as:
Yt = F(AtNt;ZY t) = (AtNt)
1￿￿Z
￿
Y t; 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where At is aggregate labor productivity which grows at a constant rate, At+1=At = GA.
Structures (Zt) are produced according to a constant returns to scale production function




t ; 0 < ￿ < 1: (2)
The structures are fully equipped or furnished, and can be used as productive structures
(such as o¢ ces and factories) or houses interchangeably:




5where ht(i) is housing used by household i in period t. With this technological speci￿cation
of structures, the ￿rm can continually adjust the entire stock of land and capital and convert
between productive structures and housing without any friction.6 The parameter (1 ￿ ￿)
measures the importance of land for the production of structures compared to capital, which
would be equal to the share of land in property income if there were separate competitive
rental markets for land and capital. Thus, we often call (1 ￿ ￿) as "the share of land in
the production of structures" hereafter. Typically, the share of land in the production of
structures is higher in urban than in rural areas, because land (or location) is more important
for production with the agglomeration of economic activities.7 We assume that the aggregate
supply of land L is ￿xed, and normalize L to be unity without loss of generality. The capital
stock depreciates at a constant rate 1 ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1) every period, but can be accumulated
through investment of goods (It) as:
Kt = ￿Kt￿1 + It: (4)
Structures built this period can be used immediately.
Households are heterogeneous in labor productivity, and can have either low, medium, or
high productivity, or be retired. Every period, there is a ￿ ow of new households born with
low productivity without any inheritance of the asset. Each low productivity household
may switch to medium productivity in the next period with a constant probability ￿
l. Each
medium productivity household has a constant probability ￿
m to become a high productivity
one in the next period. Once a household has switched to high productivity it remains at
6Davis and Heathcote (2005) use a production function in which only a ￿xed ￿ ow of new vacant land can
be used for building new houses. Perhaps, in reality, the allocation of land and capital is not as ￿ exible as in
our model but not as in￿ exible as in Davis and Heathcote (2005). We also assume there is no productivity
growth in the production of structures, because Davis and Heathcote (2005) calculate the growth rate of
productivity in the US construction sector to be close to zero (￿0:27 percent per annum). We ignore labor
used in this sector for simplicity.
7We will not attempt to explain why agglomeration arises. We should not confuse the share of land
(1 ￿ ￿) with the scarcity of land (or marginal product of land), because scarcity not only depends upon the
share of land, but also on labor productivity, the capital-labor ratio and the capital-land ratio. We will later
discuss how the share of land in the production of structures is related to the share of land in the value of
structures in footnote 18.
6this high productivity until retirement. All the households with low, medium and high
productivity are called workers, and all the workers have constant probability 1￿! 2 (0;1)
of retiring next period. Once retired, each household has constant probability 1￿￿ 2 (0;1) of
dying before the next period. (In other words, a worker continues to work with probability
!, and a retiree survives with probability ￿ in the next period). The ￿ ow of new born
workers is GN ￿ ! fraction of the workforce in the previous period, where GN > ! > ￿
i for
i = l;m. The productivity level of the individual household is private information. All the
transitions are i.i.d. across a continuum of households and over time, and thus there is no




t be populations of low, medium and high productivity workers, respectively, and let Nr
t
be the population size of retired households in period t. Then, we have:
N
l






































We choose to formulate the household￿ s life-cycle in this stylized way, following Diaz-Gimenez,
Prescott, Fitzgerald and Alvarez (1992) and Gertler (1999), because we are mainly interested
in the interaction between the life-cycles of households and the aggregate economy. The
three levels of labor productivity give us enough ￿ exibility to mimic a typical life-cycle of
wage income for our aggregate analysis.
Each household derives utility from the consumption of output (ct) and housing services
(ht) of rented or owned housing, and su⁄ers disutility from supplying labor (nt). (We suppress
the index of household i when we describe a typical household). We assume that, when the
household rents a house rather than owning (and controlling) the same house, she enjoys
smaller utility by a factor   2 (0;1). This disadvantage of rented housing re￿ ects the
tenant￿ s limited discretion over the way the house is used and modi￿ed according to her






t [u(ct;[1 ￿  I(rentt)]ht) ￿ v(nt;"t)]
!
; 0 < ￿ < 1; (5)
7where I(rentt) is an indicator function which takes the value of unity when the household
rents the house in period t and zero when she owns it.8 Disutility of labor v(nt;"t) is subject
to idiosyncratic shocks to its labor productivity "t. The value of "t is either high ("h),
medium ("m), low ("l), or 0, depending on whether the household has high, medium or
low productivity, or is retired, and follows the stationary Markov process described above.
E0(Xt) is the expected value of Xt conditional on survival at date t and conditional on
information at date 0. For most of our computation, we choose a particular utility function











and vt = 0 if nt ￿ "t; and vt becomes arbitrarily large if nt > "t. The parameter ￿ > 0 is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (as well as the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution) and ￿ 2 (0;1) re￿ ects the share of consumption of goods (rather than housing


















We focus on the environment in which there are problems in enforcing contracts and there
are constraints on trades in markets. There is no insurance market against the idiosyncratic
shock to labor productivity of each household. The only asset that households hold and
trade is the equity of structures (and the annuity contract upon this equity). Each household
can issue equity on its own house to raise funds from the other agents. But the other agents
only buy equity up to a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ 2 [0;1) of the house. Thus, in order to control the
house and enjoy full utility of a house of size ht as a home owner, the household must hold
equity st at least:
st > ￿ht: (8)
8We assume that, in order to enjoy full utility of the house, the household must own and control the
entire house used. If the household rents a fraction of the house used, then she will not enjoy full utility
even for the fraction of the house owned.
8We can think of this constraint as a collateral constraint for a residential mortgage ￿ even
though in our economy the mortgage is ￿nanced by equity rather than debt ￿ and we take ￿
as an exogenous parameter of the collateral constraint. Because the tenant household does
not have a collateral asset, we assume the tenant cannot borrow (or issue equities):
st ￿ 0: (9)
We restrict tradeable assets to be the homogeneous equity of structures in order to ab-
stract from the portfolio choice of heterogeneous households who face the collateral constraint
and uninsurable labor income risk. Because we analyze the economy under the assumption
of perfect foresight about the aggregate states, this restriction on tradeable assets is not
substantive (because all the tradeable assets would earn the same rate of return), except
for the case of an unanticipated aggregate shock. Although we do not attempt to derive
these restrictions on market transactions explicitly as the outcome of an optimal contract,
the restrictions are broadly consistent with our environment in which agents can default on
contracts, misrepresent their labor productivity, and can trade assets anonymously (if they
wish).9
Let wt be the real wage rate, rt the rental price of structures, and qt the price of equity,
a claim to the return on structures of unit size before being used in the current period. The
holder of one unit of equity receives rental income rt this period and dividend dt+1 in the
next period. The ￿ ow-of-funds constraint of the worker is given by:
ct + rtht + qtst = (1 ￿ ￿)wt"t + rtst + (dt + qt)st￿1; (10)
where ￿ is a constant tax rate on wage income. The left hand side (LHS) of this equation
is consumption, the rental cost of housing (or opportunity cost of using a house rather than
renting it out), and purchases of equities. The right hand side (RHS) is gross revenue, which
9The outside equity holders (creditors) ask the home owners to maintain some fraction of the housing
equity in order to prevent default. There is no separate market for equities on land and capital upon it,
because people prefer to control land and capital together in order to avoid the complications. Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001) show that, if agents can misrepresent their idiosyncratic income and can save privately,
the optimal contract is a simple debt contract with a credit limit. See Lustig (2004) and Lustig and van
Nieuwerburgh (2005) for analysis of optimal contracts with tangible assets as collateral.
9is the sum of after tax wage income, the rental income from equities purchased this period,
and the pre-dividend value of equity held from the previous period. The equity price qt is
also the purchase price of new structures (and (dt + qt) is the price of structure held from the
last period before maintenance and renovation investment takes place), because the owner
of new structure of unit size enjoys the same returns as an equity holder of unit size: she
uses and controls that structure (or earns the rental income rt by renting it out) and has the
resale value of structure (dt+1 + qt+1) before investment takes place in the next period.10
For the retiree who only survives until the next period with probability ￿, there is a
competitive annuity market in which the owner of a unit annuity will receive the gross
returns (dt+1 + qt+1)=￿ if and only if the owner survives, and receive nothing if dead.11 The
retiree also receives the bene￿t bt per person from the government, which is ￿nanced by the










Because the productivity of each household is private information and a low productivity
worker can pretend to be retired, the viable retirement bene￿t does not exceed after-tax




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)"
l:
10When the worker owns and controls the house of size ht and issues equity to the outside equity holders
(creditors) by outstanding size of (ht ￿ st) in period t, she faces the ￿ ow-of-fund constraint:
ct + [qtht ￿ (qt + dt)ht￿1] + rt(ht ￿ st) = (1 ￿ ￿)wt"t + [qt (ht ￿ st) ￿ (qt + dt)(ht￿1 ￿ st￿1)]:
The LHS is an out￿ ow of funds: consumption, purchases of the owned house over the resale value of the
house held from the last period, and rental income paid to the outside equity holders of this period. The
RHS is in￿ ow: after-tax wage income, and the value of new issues of outside equity above the value of
outside equity from the previous period including dividend payment. By rearranging this, we ￿nd that both
the home-owner and tenant face the same ￿ ow-of-funds constraint (10); in which only the net position of
equity matters.
11When the retiree who owned the house dies, then the house becomes the creditor￿ s ￿similar to a reverse
mortgage.
12The ￿rm observes each worker￿ s labour contribution to its production, but it does not observe whether
the worker works elsewhere as well. The ￿rm pays uniform payroll taxes before paying wages to the workers.
Although the government does not observe the productivity of each household, it observes whether the
10The ￿ ow-of-funds constraint for the retiree is
ct + rtht + qtst = bt + rtst + [(dt + qt)=￿]st￿1: (12)
Each household takes the equity from the previous period (st￿1) and the joint process of
prices, dividends and idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks fwt;rt;qt;dt;"tg as given, and
chooses the plan of consumption of goods and housing, and the equity holding fct;ht;stg
to maximize the expected discounted utility subject to the constraints of ￿ ow-of-funds and
collateral.
The representative ￿rm takes the wage rate, the rental price of structures and the rate





as given. The denominator of the RHS is the equity price after rental income is paid in this
period, and the numerator is the pre-dividend price of equity in the next period. The ￿rm
(or the shareholders of the ￿rm) owns and controls land and capital from last period, and
faces the ￿ ow-of-funds constraint,
Yt ￿ wtNt ￿ rtZY t ￿ It + rtZt + qt (Zt ￿ Zt￿1) = dtZt￿1 + rtZt:
Here, the sum of the net cash ￿ ow from production, the rental income from structures
produced, and the value of new equity issues in the LHS is equal to the total dividend
payment to the equity holders of the previous period and this period in the RHS, because
the ￿rm keeps the number of equities being equal to the size of structures produced.13
Then, from (13) under perfect foresight, the value of the ￿rm to the equity holders from the
previous period is equal to the present value of the net cash ￿ ow from production and the
household works or not, at least with some probability by random monitoring. We assume that the penalty
of getting caught for cheating is su¢ ciently high, so that no worker receives the bene￿t while working.
13The ￿rm follows this particular policy of dividend and equity issue in order to make the equity price
be equal to the purchase price of structure. However, alternative dividend policies do not change alloca-
tions because the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds in our economy under perfect foresight and would only
complicate the expression for the collateral constraint and prices.
11rental income of structures produced:
Vt ￿ (dt + qt)Zt￿1 = Yt ￿ wtNt ￿ rtZY t ￿ It + rtZt + (qt ￿ rt)Zt (14)





[Ys ￿ wsNs ￿ rsZY s ￿ Is + rsZs]:
The ￿rm chooses a production plan fNt;ZY t;Yt;It;Ktg to maximize the value of the ￿rm,
subject to the constraints of technology (1);(2);(3) and (4):
The representative foreigner purchases goods C￿




t can be negative), subject to the international ￿ ow-of-funds constraint







t + (dt + qt)S
￿
t￿1: (15)
The LHS is gross expenditure of foreigners on home goods and equities, and the RHS is the
gross receipts of foreigners. Although the foreigner may maximize their objective, here we
posit the reduced form demand function for home equities of the representative foreigner as
an increasing function of the gap between the rate of return on home equities and the rate









+ ￿(Rt ￿ R
￿
t);
where ￿ > 0 is the sensitivity of demand with respect to the gap in the rates of returns, and
S
￿
is the parameter which summarizes the other determinants of their demand. One special
case is a small open economy in which ￿ ! 1, and another special case is a closed economy
in which S
￿
= ￿ = 0.
Given the above choice of many households and a representative ￿rm and a foreigner,
the competitive equilibrium of our economy is characterized by the prices fwt;rt;qtg which



































st (i)di + S
￿
t: (18)
12and (3)14: Because of Walras￿Law, one of these four market clearing conditions is not inde-
pendent.
2.2 Behavior of Representative Firm
The ￿rst order conditions for the value maximization of the representative ￿rm are:
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)Yt=Nt; (19)























The ￿rst two equations are the familiar equality of price and marginal products of factors of
production. The value of N0
t is the labor in e¢ ciency unit, and ft is a fraction of structures
used for production. The last equation says that the opportunity cost of holding capital for
one period ￿the cost of capital ￿should be equal to the marginal value product of capital,























Because the production function of output is constant returns to scale, there is no pro￿t
associated with regular production. The resulting value of the ￿rm is:
Vt = rtZt ￿ (Kt ￿ ￿Kt￿1) +
1
Rt
[rt+1Zt+1 ￿ (Kt+1 ￿ ￿Kt)] + ::: (24)

















The ￿rst term of the RHS is the capital stock inherited from the previous period, and the
second term is the value of land, which is proportional to the present value of augmented
14The name of individual household i is such that a fraction of new-born households named after the names










13output Yt=ft: Thus, the equity holders as a whole receive returns from capital and land
through their holdings of equities of the entire structure.
2.3 Household Behavior
The household chooses one among three modes of housing - becoming a tenant, a credit
constrained home-owner, and an unconstrained home-owner. The ￿ ow-of-funds constraint
of the worker and retiree can be rewritten as
ct + rtht + (qt ￿ rt)st = (1 ￿ ￿)wt"t + (dt + qt)st￿1 ￿ xt;
ct + rtht + (qt ￿ rt)st = bt + [(dt + qt)=￿]st￿1 ￿ xt;
where xt is the liquid wealth of the household. Liquid wealth is the wealth of the household,
excluding illiquid human capital (the expected discounted value of future wage and pension
income). We call liquid wealth ￿net worth￿hereafter.
2.3.1 The tenant
The tenant chooses consumption of goods and housing services to maximize the utility, which
leads to:
ct : rtht = ￿ : 1 ￿ ￿:
Using the ￿ ow-of-funds constraint we can express housing and consumption as functions of
current expenditure:
ct = ￿[xt ￿ (qt ￿ rt)st];
and
ht =
(1 ￿ ￿)[xt ￿ (qt ￿ rt)st]
rt
:






xt ￿ (qt ￿ rt)st
[rt=(1 ￿  )]1￿￿
￿1￿￿
:
Due to the lower utility from living in a rented house, the tenant e⁄ectively faces a higher
rental price than the home owner for the same utility, i.e., [rt=(1 ￿  )] rather than rt:
142.3.2 The constrained home-owner
The constrained home owner faces a binding collateral constraint as:
st = ￿ht:
Thus he consumes ht = st=￿ amount of housing services, and spends the remaining on goods
as:
ct = xt ￿
￿























2.3.3 The unconstrained home-owner
The collateral constraint is not binding to the unconstrained home-owner. Her intra-
temporal choice is identical to the tenant￿ s but she does not su⁄er from the limited discretion











Let At be the vector of variables and a function that characterizes the aggregate state of the
economy at the beginning of period t :












where ￿t("t(i);st￿1(i)) is the date-t joint distribution function of present productivity and
equity holdings from the previous period across households. Each household has perfect
foresight about the future evolution of this aggregate state, even if each faces idiosyncratic
risks on her labor productivity. The prices and dividend (wt;rt;qt;dt) would be a function
of this aggregate state in equilibrium. We can express the value functions of the retiree,
15high, medium and the low productivity worker by V r(xt;At); V h(xt;At); V m(xt;At); and
V l(xt;At) as functions of the individual net worth and the aggregate state.
The retiree chooses the mode of housing and an annuity contract on equities, st, subject










j (st;xt;rt;qt) + ￿￿V
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where uj (st;xt;rt;qt) is the indirect utility function of present consumption and housing
service when the mode of housing is tenant (j = T), constrained home-owner (j = C), or
unconstrained home-owner (j = U).
The worker chooses the mode of housing and saving to buy the equities. The value











uj (st;xt;rt;qt) + ￿[!V h((1 ￿ ￿)"hwt+1 + (dt+1 + qt+1)st;At+1)






The high productivity worker may retire with probability 1 ￿ ! next period, and continues
to work with probability !:
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uj (st;xt;rt;qt) + ￿[(! ￿ ￿
m)V m((1 ￿ ￿)"mwt+1 + (dt+1 + qt+1)st;At+1)
+￿
mV h((1 ￿ ￿)"hwt+1 + (dt+1 + qt+1)st;At+1)
+(1 ￿ !)V r(bt+1 + (dt+1 + qt+1)st;At+1)]
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Next period, the medium productivity worker switches to high productivity with probability
￿
m, retires with probability 1 ￿ !, and remains with medium productivity with probability
!￿￿
m: The value function of a low productivity worker is similar to the value function of a
medium productivity worker, except for m being replaced by l and h being replaced by m.
Growth in the economy with land presents a unique problem for the solution of the
individual agent problem because wages grow at di⁄erent rates from the rental price and
16the equity price even in the steady state. This means that we need to transform the non-
stationary per capita variables in the model into stationary per capita units. In Appendix
B, we describe how to convert the value functions of the household into a stationary repre-
sentation.
2.4 Steady State Growth
Before calibrating, it is useful to examine the steady state growth properties of our economy.
Let GX = Xt+1=Xt be the steady state growth factor of variable Xt. In the following we
simply call the growth factor as the ￿growth rate￿ . In steady state, the growth rate of










The growth rate of structures need not be equal the growth rate of output, but it should be







Then, from the production functions, these growth rates depend upon the growth rates of
aggregate labor productivity and population as GY = (GAGN)1￿￿ G
￿







Because the supply of land is ￿xed, to the extent that land is an important input for produc-
ing structures, the growth rates of output and structures are both smaller than the growth
rate of labor in e¢ ciency units. Moreover, because structures are more directly a⁄ected by
the limitation of land than output, the growth rate of structures is lower than the growth
rate of output, when labor in e¢ ciency units is growing.
In the steady state of the competitive economy, the growth rate of the real rental price
and the purchase price of structures is equal to the ratio of the growth rate of output and













17To the extent that land is important for the production of structures (￿ < 1), the rate of
increase of the rental price and the purchase price of structures is an increasing function of
the growth rate of workers in e¢ ciency units in steady state. The wage rate grows in the













Because the per capita supply of land decreases with population growth, the growth rate of
the wage rate is a decreasing function of the population growth rate.
3 Observations
Here, we gather some observations, which give us some guidance for our calibrations.
3.1 Features of U.S. Economy
Table 1 summarizes the features of the US. economy, relevant for our aggregate economy.
Table 1: Long run aggregate features of the U.S. economy
1900 1939 1958 Average
Nonfarm private tangible assets/GDP 3.01 3.00 2.66 3.3
Fraction of productive structures 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.53
Land/GDP 1.61 0.96 0.66 -
Residential Land/GDP - 0.28 0.18 0.39
Market Value of Homes/GDP - 1.30 1.10 1.28
Notes to Table 1: Nonfarm private tangible assets, the fraction of productive structures and
total land from 1900 to 1958 are from Goldsmith (1962), Tables A35-A43. GDP is from GDP -
Millennial Edition Series of Table Ca9-19 of Volume 3 of Carter et. al. (2006). The nonfarm private
tangible assets is the sum of nonfarm private residential and nonresidential structures and land,
producer and consumer durables, and inventory. The fraction of productive structures is de￿ned
as (nonfarm private nonresidential structures and land+producer durables+inventory)/(nonfarm
private tangible asset). Average for the ￿rst two rows refers to the average quarterly estimates
18between 1952:Q1 and 2005:Q4 for the US economy based on Flow of Funds data (see Appendix C
for the construction). The numbers for the last two rows are from Davis and Heathcote (2007) and
the average is the annual average between 1930 and 2000.
We observe the tangible assets of nonfarm private sector (which include land value) is
about 3 years worth of GDP, and that the ratio is fairly stable. The fraction of productive
structures (ZY t=Zt) shows only small change over the long period of time. On the other hand,
the ratio of land value to annual GDP falls from 1.61 in 1900 to 0.66 in 1958. This is largely
due to a decline of the share of agricultural land. If we look at the ratio of private nonfarm
land to GDP, it only falls from 0.57 in 1900 to 0.36 in 1958 (according to Goldsmith (1962)
Table A-5). This remaining decline suggests that the elasticity of substitution between land
and reproducible capital in production of fully equipped structures may exceed unity in the
United States, because the share of land value decreases as capital accumulates. (Roughly
speaking, the scarcity of land is relatively easily mitigated by using technology with higher
capital-land ratio). Thus, our assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function is a rough
approximation of the production of structures.15
3.2 Evolution of home-ownership rates
There exists considerable variation in home ownership rates across countries and over time.
Table 2 shows the home ownership rates (fraction of households that own and control houses)
of selected developed countries between 1970 and 2003 taken from IMF World Economic
Outlook (Terrones (2004)). The table shows a general upward trend in home-ownership
rates across countries since 1970.
15For Japan, Kiyotaki and West (2006) provide evidence that the elasticity of substitution between land
and capital is not signi￿cantly larger than unity for the period 1961-1995.
19Table 2: Home ownership rates in % 1970 1980 1990 2003
United States 64.2 65.6 64.0 68.3
Germany - 41.0 39.0 43.6
Italy - 59.0 68.0 80.0
United Kingdom 50.0 55.0 66.0 70.0
Japan - 60.0 61.0 62.0
Notes to Table 2: See Table 2.1 in page 73 of World Economic Outlook (September 2004).
Focussing on the U.S., Table 3 shows the evolution of home ownership rates for white
and black households for the 1900-1990 period derived from Collins and Margo (2001).
Table 3: U.S. Home ownership rates in %
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 1990
whites 48.5 47.1 42.1 64.0 68.6 66.5
blacks 24.1 24.6 20.5 35.8 43.8 40.9
We observe that there is a substantial gap between white and black households, re￿ ecting
the di⁄erence in their income and access to the credit market. The home ownership rates
for both whites and blacks declined during the Great Depression, before increasing after
WWII. During the 1980s, average home ownership rate declined, perhaps because of the
high nominal and real interest rates16.
4 Calibrations
4.1 Parameters for Calibration
All but two parameters are chosen to be roughly consistent with aggregate or individual data.
The two free parameters are the discount factor (￿) that is chosen to generate a reasonable
structures to output ratio (3:3), and the fraction of utility loss from renting a house ( ) that
16The high nominal interest rate often tightens the credit constraint, because the payment of traditional
￿xed interest mortgage in earlier stage increases with a higher nominal interest rate, and because lenders
tend to restrict loans to households with a high ratio of mortgage payments to disposable income.
20is chosen to generate a su¢ cient number of tenants (around 25%). All the parameters for
the baseline calibration are given in Table 4:
Table 4: Parameters for Baseline Calibration
￿ = 0:258 : share of productive structures in production of output
￿ = 0:9 : share of capital in the production of structures
1 ￿ ￿ = 0:1 : depreciation rate
S
￿
= 0 : exogenous foreign demand for domestic equities
￿ = 0 : elasticity of foreign demand with respect to return gap
￿ = 0:96 : utility discount factor
￿ = 0:75 : share of nondurables in total expenditure
￿ = 2 : coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
  = 0:09 : fraction of utility loss from renting a house
￿ = 0:3 : fraction of house that needs downpayment
￿
l = 0:08, ￿
m = 0:014 : probability of switching to a higher wage
"l = 0:331; "m = 0:663 and "h = 2:650 : labor productivities
b
w = 0:2 : ratio of retirement bene￿t to pre-tax wages of average worker
! = 0:978 : probability of continuing working
￿ = 0:945 : probability of the retiree to survive
GA = 1:02 : labor productivity growth
GN = 1:01 : population growth
We consider one period of our model to be roughly one year and think of the baseline
economy as the United States. The share of productive structures in the production of non-
housing ￿nal output (￿ = 0:258) is a bit lower than the one used in other studies (0:3 ￿ 0:4
range), because we treat the production of housing services separately (and this is a capital
intensive sector). Using the Cooley and Prescott (1995) methodology of aligning the data to
their theoretical counterparts, Appendix C outlines how we estimate ￿ from the U.S. Flow
of Funds and NIPA data for the period 1952:Q1 to 2005:Q4.
A key parameter in our model is the share of land in the production of structures (1￿￿).
Thinking of the U.S. economy as our baseline, we set ￿ = 0:9 since Haughwout and Inman
21(2001) calculate the share of land in property income between 1987 and 2005 to be about
10:9%, while Davis and Heathcote (2005) also use ￿ = 0:9. Davis and Heathcote (2007)
note that the share of land in residential housing values has risen recently in the U.S., and it
is close to 50% in major metropolitan areas like Boston and San Francisco. For comparisons,
we will use ￿ = 0:5 to highlight the in￿ uence of the share of land on the allocations in the
steady state as well as in the transition.17
The depreciation rate of capital stock (1 ￿ ￿) is set at 10 percent per annum, while the
annual discount factor is set at 0:96 and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion at 2, all
standard parameter choices. For the baseline, we consider a closed economy so that both
S
￿
and ￿ are set to be zero. Recent papers have calibrated ￿ (the share of non-durables
in total expenditure) at around 0:8 (Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2007) use 0:83 and Li and
Yao (2006) use 0:8 based on the average share of housing expenditure found in the 2001
Consumer Expenditure Survey). We use a slightly lower number since we think of housing
as inclusive of other durables.
The utility loss from renting a house ( ) is set to generate reasonable implications for
the aggregate home-ownership rate: a small value for   at around 0:09 worked well to
generate the observed fraction of renters in the data. The fraction of a house that needs a
downpayment (￿) is set at 30% but we perform extensive comparative statics relative to this
parameter since one of our goals is to better understand the role of collateral constraints on
home-ownership rates, house prices and allocations.
The probability (￿
l; ￿
m) of switching earnings states is set so that population ratio of
low, medium and high productive workers is approximately equal to 30%; 50%; and 20%.
17Caselli and Freyer (2007) note that, in recent World Bank data, share of land value in total tangible
assets range between 12 and 27 percent for a range of countries but rise to 51 percent for Japan. In the













of the share of land in property income (1 ￿ ￿); because the capital depreciates while the imputed rental
income of land grows at the rate of output growth. Thus in the baseline economy in which R = 1:0683 and
GY = 1:0292; when the share of land income is 1 ￿ ￿ =10%, the share of land in the value of structure is
equal to 32%. When ￿ = 0:5; we have GY = 1:0257; and the share of land in the value of structure is 80%
for the same real rate of return. Although the income share of land of 50% is perhaps too high, it helps to
understand the metropolitan area of Tokyo or New York.
22The ratio of the earnings shocks are calibrated to have mean normalized to one and the
relative shares are chosen to re￿ ect substantial earnings heterogeneity. We use the levels
used by Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003), while ignoring their fourth state
that captures the wealth distribution of the super wealthy for simplicity. The probability
of continuing to work (!) is set so that the expected duration of working life is 45:5 years,
while the probability of the retiree to survive (￿) implies an expected retirement duration
of 18:2 years. The replacement ratio (b) implies that the ratio of the government retirement
bene￿t to the after-tax wage is equal to b=
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)"l￿
= 0:647 for a low productivity worker,
and is equal to b=
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)"h￿
= 0:081 for a high productivity worker. This generates the
intended redistribution of the pension system. We set the growth rate of labor productivity
(GA) to two percent, and population growth rate (GN) to one percent.
4.2 General Features of Household Behavior
The household chooses present consumption, saving, and mode of housing, taking into ac-
count its net worth and its expectations of future income. Figure 1A illustrates the con-
sumption of goods, housing services and the mode of housing of the worker with low pro-
ductivity as a function of net worth. In order to explore the stable relationship between the
household choice and the state variable, we detrend all variables using their own theoretical
trend as in Appendix B. When the worker does not have much net worth, x < x1l, he
does not have enough to pay for a downpayment of even a tiny house. He chooses to rent
a modest house and consume a modest amount. Hoping to become more productive in the
future, the low productivity worker hardly saves. In Figure 1B; the locus s0 = s(s;q;yl)
shows the equity-holding at the end of the present period as a function of the equity-holding
at the end of the last period for the low productivity worker. Everyone enters the labor
market with low productivity and no inheritance s0 = 0: As long as the worker continues
to be with low productivity, he does not save, and continues to live in a rented house.18
18No saving by a low productivity worker is not always true. If the income gap between low productivity
and higher productivity workers is small, the transition probability from less to more productive states is
small, or the pension is very limited, then the low productivity worker saves to accumulate net worth to buy
a house or for retirement.
23Figure 2A shows the choice of a worker in the medium productivity state. When
she does not have much net worth to pay for a downpayment to buy a house, x < x1m;
she chooses to rent a place, a similar behavior with the low productivity worker. The
main di⁄erence is that the medium productivity worker saves vigorously to accumulate the
downpayment to buy a house in the future. In Figure 2B; the s0 = s(s;q;ym) locus (the
transition of equity-holdings of the medium productive worker from this to the next period)
lies above the 45-degree line for s < sm￿, so that the equity holding at the end of this period
is larger than the last period. When the medium productivity worker accumulates modest
net worth, x 2 [x1m;x2m] in Figure 2A; she buys her own house subject to the binding
collateral constraint. Here, the size of an owned house is a sharply increasing function of
net worth, because the worker maximizes the size of the house subject to the downpayment
constraint.19 When the medium productivity worker has substantial net worth x > x2m;
she becomes an unconstrained home owner, using her saving partly to repay the debt (or
increase the housing equity ownership). In Figure 2B, the medium productivity worker
continues to accumulate her equity holding until she reaches the level of equity-holding at
sm￿; the intersection of s(s;q;ym) and the 45-degree line.
The behavior of the high productivity worker is similar to the medium productivity one,
except that she accumulates more equities: s0 = s(s;q;yh) lies above s0 = s(s;q;ym) and
her converging equity-holding sh￿ is larger than that of medium productive worker sm￿:
Therefore, the equity holding of all the workers is distributed in s 2 [0;sh￿]; with mass of
workers at both s = 0; s = sm￿ and s = sh￿:
Figure 3A illustrates the consumption and housing choices of the retiree. Figure 3B
illustrates the transition of equity-holding of the retiree. Because in our economy, the
19The size of the house at net worth x = x1m is smaller than the house rented at net worth slightly below
x1m, because she can only a⁄ord to pay downpayment on a smaller house. (Nonetheless, she is happier than
before, because she derives more utility from the owned home than a rented place). The worker moves to
a bigger house every period in our model because there are no transaction costs. If there were transaction
costs, the worker would move infrequently, and change housing consumption by discrete amounts, rather than
continuously. (The housing ladder would become a true ladder, instead of having a continual upward slope).
She may even buy ￿rst a larger house than the house rented before, anticipating the future transaction cost.
But the basic features remain the same.
24productive workers have strong incentives to save for retirement and mitigate the collateral
constraint, the equilibrium level of capital stock and structures tend to be fairly large. Then,
for a large set of parameters, the rate of return on equity-holding (in terms of utility) is not
high relative to the time preference rate, taking into account the e⁄ect of growth. (Note
that the real rate of return should be su¢ ciently higher than the time preference rate in
a growing economy for the retiree to maintain their relative equity holding). Thus, the
transition of equity-holding of the retirees, the locus s0 = s(s;q;b), lies below the 45-degree
line for s > sr￿. Thus the retiree slowly decreases his equity-holding along the locus s(s;q;b)
until s = sr￿: The relative decumulation of equity holding of the retiree stops at s = sr￿,
the threshold for him to become a constrained home owner, and his holding stays at sr￿
afterwards.20
Putting together these arguments, we can draw a picture of a typical life-cycle in Figure
4: The horizontal axis counts years from the beginning of work-life, and the vertical axis
measures housing consumption (h) and equity-holding (s). Starting from no inheritance,
he chooses to live in a rented house without saving during the young and low wage periods
until the 19th year. When he becomes a medium productivity wage worker at the 20th year,
he starts saving vigorously. Quickly, he buys a house subject to the collateral constraint.
Then he moves up fast the housing ladder to become a unconstrained home owner at the
22nd year: Afterwards, he starts increasing the fraction of his own equity of the house
(similar to repaying the debt), instead of moving to the maximum size house subject to the
20In the baseline economy, there is a small population of the retirees who never had medium productivity
during the working period and thus retire without any net worth. Because they give up hope of becoming
more productive at the time of retirement and their pension is not much lower than their after-tax wage
income in the Baseline economy, they save to become a constrained home owner by accumulating equity
holding along the locus of s0 = s(s;q;b) (which lies above 45-degree line for s < sr￿). This saving pattern
of the retiree will not arise in an economy in which there are su¢ cient incentives for low wage workers to
save (because of a small pension, for example). In such an economy, the equilibrium real interest rate is
low and the retiree￿ s equity-holding rule s0 = s(s;q;b) lies below the 45-degree line for all s > 0: Then, the
retiree will become a constrained home owner and then become a tenant as he gets older. Eventually, the
shareholding of the retiree will stop when he eats up all the equities at point s = sr￿ = 0: After that, the
retiree will rely entirely on the bene￿t to pay for rent and consumption.
25collateral constraint. By the time of retirement, he has repaid all the mortgage and has
accumulated equities higher than the value of his own house.21 When the worker hits the
wall of retirement (with the arrival of a retirement shock) at the 51st year, his permanent
income drops, and he moves to a smaller house. He also sells all the equities to buy an
annuity contract on the equities, because the annuity earns the gross rate of return which is
(1=￿) > 1 times as much as straightforward equity-holding. But his e⁄ective utility discount
factor shrinks by a factor ￿ too. Thus as the rate of return on the annuity is not su¢ ciently
high to induce the retiree to save enough, he decumulates slowly the relative equity-holding,
downsizing his consumption of goods and housing services relative to the working population
as he gets older. When he dies, his assets drop to zero, according to the annuity contract
(which pays zero if the contract holder dies).
4.3 Comparison of Steady States
4.3.1 Closed Economy
We present our results from comparing steady states in Table 5: In the baseline calibration in
the ￿rst column, the fraction of tenants in the population is about 25%, which is substantial
but a bit lower than the number from Collins and Margo (2001). The fraction of constrained
home owners is 8:3%. The fraction of houses lived in by tenants and constrained home
owners is smaller than the fraction of their population, because they live in smaller houses
than the unconstrained home owners, on average. The average size of a tenant￿ s house is
about 34:6% (= 8:69=25:16) of the average house size of the economy, and the average house
size of constrained home owners is about 29% of the economy average. The tenants and the
constrained home owners live in smaller houses than the unconstrained home owners, mainly
because the former have lower permanent income.22 The distribution of equity-holding is
even more unequal among the groups of households in di⁄erent modes of housing. The
fraction of total equities held by tenants is negligible (0:05%), the fraction of total equities
21Remember that the aggregate equity-holding of structures of all the households is the sum of all the
houses and productive structures in equilibrium.
22The constrained home owners, in addition, tend to choose smaller housing in order to meet the collateral
constraint. This feature is due to the absense of transaction costs. See footnote (20):
26held by constrained home owners is 0:33%, and the remainder is held by unconstrained home
owners. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the distribution of wealth is
much more skewed than the distribution of income. Perhaps a new insight would be that,
when the distribution of wealth and income are di¢ cult to observe, we can infer inequality
by looking at the home ownership rates across di⁄erent groups of people, as Collins and
Margo (2001) did.
Turning to prices and aggregate variables, the gross rate of return on equity-holding is
1:068 in terms of goods, and is equal to 1:068 ￿ G1￿￿
r = 1:067 in terms of the consumption
basket. The latter is smaller than the inverse of the discount factor, which, adjusted for
growth e⁄ects, equals (1=￿)(Gw=G1￿￿
r )
￿ = 1:080: This is not because people are impatient,
but because people tend to save substantially during the working period in order to cope
with idiosyncratic shocks to the labor productivity and to mitigate the collateral constraint.
Many general equilibrium models with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk have such a feature,
including Bewley (1977) and Aiyagari (1994). Even though some aggregate variables are
not the same as the numbers in Table 3, they are broadly consistent with the main features
of the US economy. The ratio of average housing value to the average wage is 2:6 years,
while the housing price to rental ratio is 8:5 years in the baseline economy. The ratio of
value of total structures to GDP is 2:9 years, while the share of housing in total structures
is 46%.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 report the results for a di⁄erent level of ￿nancial development.
Column 2 is the case of a more advanced ￿nancial system, where the fraction of house
that needs downpayment is 0:1 instead of 0:3 (the baseline number). The main di⁄erence
relative to the baseline economy is that now there are more constrained home owners instead
of tenants. Intuitively, because borrowing becomes easier, relatively poor households buy
a house with high leverage (outside equity ownership) instead of renting. Column 3, by
comparison, is the case of no housing mortgage (￿ = 1) so that the household must buy
the house from its own net worth. In this economy, the fraction of tenants is signi￿cantly
larger. Financial development a⁄ects substantially the home-ownership rate. On the other
hand, ￿nancial development by itself has limited e⁄ects on prices and aggregate quantities
in steady state. This result arises because the equity holding of tenants and constrained
27households (who are directly in￿ uenced by the ￿nancing constraint) is a small fraction of
aggregate wealth, and because the required adjustment is mostly achieved through conversion
of houses between being rented and being owned.
In column 4, we consider an economy in which the growth rate of labor productivity
is three percent instead of two percent. A higher growth rate of productivity leads to
a substantially higher rate of return on equity, given the low elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. The housing price-rental ratio is lower because of the higher real interest rate
which dominates the e⁄ect of a larger expected growth rate of the rental price. The e⁄ects
on workers￿saving rate and home-ownership rate are limited, because the higher rate of
return encourages saving while higher expected wages in the future discourage saving.
In Column 5, we decrease the ratio of the retirement bene￿t to average pre-tax wage to
0:1 from 0:2 (the baseline). This has signi￿cant overall e⁄ects on both the distribution of
the mode of housing and aggregate allocations because households save more in preparing
for the retirement shock. As a result of the more vigorous saving among workers, the rate
of return on equities is lower than the rate of time preference, and the home ownership rate
increases in the new steady state.
In Columns 6, we consider an economy in which share of land in production of structures
is larger (￿ = 0:5) than in the baseline. Because the share of land is larger, the housing
price-rental ratio is substantially higher (11:7 years instead of 8:5 years in the baseline),
re￿ ecting the higher expected growth rate of future rental rates. The rate of return in terms
of output is substantially higher, even though the rate of return on the consumption basket is
muted by the growth in rents ￿R=G1￿￿
r = 1:088 instead of 1:092: The home-ownership rate
is higher because a higher real rate of return on equity encourages saving, which outweighs
the negative e⁄ect of a higher housing price-rental ratio.
4.3.2 Small Open Economy
We can conduct the above comparative steady state for the case of a small open economy,
i.e., ￿ = 1 instead of ￿ = 0, by keeping the real interest rate at the exogenous level of the
world interest rate R￿ = 1:0683 in Table 6. This exercise is useful to examine a regional
28economy within a country (like London in the U.K. or New York in the U.S.), as well as to
prepare the analysis of the transition in the next section.
The baseline results (column 1) in table 6 are identical to their closed economy counter-
parts (column 1 of table 5) since the world real return is chosen to be the same as the baseline
of the closed economy. The main di⁄erence from the closed economy arises in the e⁄ect of
higher labor productivity in column 4. Faced with higher productivity growth, and with the
real return not adjusting, there is a pronounced increase in the housing price-rental ratio and
a substantial decrease in the home-ownership rate. This contrasts sharply with the closed
economy, and suggests that the level of international capital market integration may be im-
portant in assessing the way in which fundamentals a⁄ect housing prices, home-ownership
rates and aggregate allocations. A one percent reduction in the world real rate in column
6 also leads to a substantial increase in house price-rental ratio. The other experiments
generate similar e⁄ects as in the closed economy model.
5 Winners and Losers in Housing Markets
We now examine how the small open economy reacts to a once-for-all change in di⁄erent
fundamental conditions in technology and the ￿nancial environment. We change a parameter
once-and-for-all unexpectedly and solve for the path of prices and quantities that lead the
economy to the new steady state. Here, we assume perfect foresight except for the initial
surprise. Details of the numerical procedure can be found in Appendix A, but the basic
procedure is: ￿rst guess a set of house prices over the next (say) 50 years, which converges
to the new steady state; then solve backwards the household problem based on these prices;
and ￿nally update this price vector until the market for housing services clears in all periods.
To highlight the importance of land, we compare the reaction of the economy with a larger
share of land in the production of structures (￿ = 0:5) with the baseline economy (￿ = 0:9).
This gives us a sense of how an economy like Japan or the UK might respond di⁄erently to
shocks, relative to the U.S. baseline.
295.1 Welfare Evaluations
We are particularly interested in how an unanticipated change in fundamentals a⁄ects the
welfare of various groups of households di⁄erently. Here, using the joint distribution of
current productivity and equity holdings from the previous period ￿("t(i);s￿1 (i)) in the
steady state before the shock hits, we de￿ne the group as the set Ig of individual house-
holds of a particular labor productivity (low, medium, high, and retired (l;m;h;r)), and a
particular range of equity holdings of the previous period which corresponds to a particular
home-ownership mode (tenant, constrained owner or unconstrained owner) in the old steady
state. For example, the low-wage worker tenant group is a group of agents with low labor
productivity who choose to be tenants under the old steady state.
One simple measure of the distribution e⁄ect is the average rate of change of net worth.
Let j (i) be present labor productivity of (j(i) = h;m;l and r) of individual i. Then the
net worth of individual i depends upon the wage rate, dividend and equity price as:
x(i) = w￿
j(i) + (d + q)e s￿1(i);
where ￿j = (1￿￿)"j for worker of productivity j and ￿j = (b=w) for j = r; retired, e s￿1 (i) =
s￿1 (i) if i was a worker and e s￿1 (i) = s￿1 (i)=￿ if i was a retiree in the previous period.
Then, the average rate of change in net worth (non-human wealth) of group Ig is:
average of
￿
[wn￿j(i) + (dn + qn)e s￿1(i)]
[wo￿j(i) + (do + qo)e s￿1(i)]
￿ 1
￿
for all i 2 Ig (27)
where (wo;do;qo) are the wage rate, dividend and equity price in the old steady state, and
(wn;dn;qn) are those immediately after the shock.
Alternatively, we can use the value functions. Given that we have solved for the prices
and value functions for all the periods in the transition, we know that the value functions
at the period when the change in fundamentals takes place is a su¢ cient statistic for the
welfare e⁄ect of the shock. Let V
j(i)
o (x(i)) be the value function at the old steady state and
V
j(i)
n (x(i)) be the value function in the period of the shock￿ s arrival as a function of net
worth x(i) and labor productivity.23 We compute a measure of welfare change for the group
23Note that Vn is the value function that has been derived after the full perfect foresight transition has
been solved for and therefore includes all this information about the transition to the new steady state.
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n ([wn￿j(i) + (dn + qn)e s￿1(i)])
V
j(i)





5 for all i 2 Ig: (28)
We call this measure as the certainty expenditure equivalent, because we convert the change
of the value into the dimension of expenditure before taking the average.24
5.2 Transition of Small Open Economy following a Change in Fun-
damentals
Figure 5 shows the responses to a once-for-all increase in the growth rate of labor pro-
ductivity from 2% to 3%. Because the economy is growing, all the following ￿gures show
the percentage di⁄erence from the steady state growth path of the baseline economy. In
both economies the housing price increases substantially initially and continues to increase
afterwards. In the economy with a larger share of land (￿ = 0:5), the increase in house
prices is larger, and real house price in￿ ation afterwards is higher. The housing price-rental
ratio is going to be higher, anticipating the increase in the rental price in the future. The
home-ownership rate gradually declines because young workers take a longer time to accu-
mulate a su¢ cient downpayment to buy a house. Consumption of goods and housing service
increase initially as well as afterwards, re￿ ecting a higher permanent income. The share
of productive structures (ZY t=Zt) falls initially, in order to accommodate larger demand for
24 We also computed the net worth equivalent that would make a household indi⁄erent between the period
before and after the shock as the value of ￿(i) such that
V j(i)
o ([wo￿j(i) + (do + qo)e s￿1(i)]) = V j(i)
n (￿(i)[wn￿j(i) + (dn + qn)e s￿1(i)])
The value of ￿(i) measures how much the initial net worth must be multiplied immediately after the shock
in order to maintain the same level of the expected discounted utility as the old steady state. We can ￿nd
the net worth equivalent uniquely, because the value functions are monotonically increasing. We can then
compute the average of individual ￿(i) ￿ 1 for a particular group g of agents as e ￿g. This welfare measure
su⁄ers from the drawback that net worth does not include the value of human capital. Thus, if two groups
have di⁄erent ratios of net worth (liquid wealth) to human capital, a di⁄erence in e ￿g may re￿ ect the di⁄erence
of the ratio of human to non-human wealth rather than the di⁄erence in the welfare e⁄ect.
31residential structures by converting productive structures to residential structures.
Table 7 reports the average rate of change of welfare (28) in Panel A and the average
rate of change of non-human net worth (27) in Panel B for each group against changes in the
fundamentals, for the baseline economy (￿ = 0:9) and the economy with a larger share of land
(￿ = 0:5). The ￿rst and second columns report the average rate of changes from an increase
in the growth rate of labor productivity from 2% to 3%. Given the higher productivity
growth, households are on average better o⁄ with a higher permanent income. (Remember
the retiree￿ s bene￿t is proportional to the wage rate of present workers). The higher housing
price, however, a⁄ects the welfare of di⁄erent groups of households di⁄erently. Those who
buy (or expand) houses in the future lose from the housing price hike, while those who sell
houses in the future gain. This redistribution e⁄ect is larger in the economy with the larger
share of land since the house price hike is bigger in this economy. We can observe the
change in non-human net worth in Panel B. The net worth of tenant workers falls because
the wage dips with initial conversion from productive to residential structures. On the other
hand, workers with higher holdings of shares (constrained and unconstrained homeowners)
and retirees experience an increase in net worth with the house price rise, and the increase
is more pronounced where the land is more important.
Figure 6 shows how these two economies react to a once-for-all fall in the world real
interest rate by 1%. In both economies, housing prices and output increase with large in￿ ows
of capital, and the adjustment of housing prices is fast. In the economy with a larger share
of land, the swing of net exports and consumption is larger, output takes a longer time to
increase despite the large increase in the capital stock, because a large amount of structures
gets allocated to housing in the early stages of the transition. The home-ownership rate
declines gradually because the lower real interest rate discourages saving, delaying the age
of switching from renting to owning a house over the life cycle. The third and fourth
columns of Table 7 report the reaction of welfare to this decrease in the world real interest
rate for the two economies with di⁄erent shares of land. Because the real interest rate
is lower than the time preference rate in our old steady state economy, a further decrease
in the real interest rate hurts a majority of people who save for retirement. The higher
house prices also have important redistribution e⁄ects between net buyers and net sellers
32of houses. Low-wage workers as a group lose more in the economy with a larger share of
land. Retirees (particularly unconstrained homeowner retirees) who tend to be net sellers
of houses, gain more with a larger share of land, because they bene￿t more from the house
price hike. Looking at the value of net worth in Panel B, all groups are wealthier from a
higher house price, and the wealth increase is larger for each group (except for low income
workers) in the economy with a larger share of land than the baseline economy.
The ￿fth and sixth columns of Table 7 report the welfare e⁄ects from down-sizing the
pension system. Given the constant world interest rate, there is a small increase in house
prices re￿ ecting the higher private saving in the economy. Because now people have to save
more privately for retirement with low real interest rate, welfare tends to fall signi￿cantly,
and the fall is more dramatic for the currently retired households (whose present value of
pension falls dramatically). Workers are a⁄ected but less than retirees, and most of the fall
appears in the tenant workers who have to save more for retirement. The revaluation e⁄ects
are very small in panel B, illustrating that most of the welfare change is coming from a
change in savings behavior in this instance.
We have also done the experiment of lowering the downpayment requirement from 30%
to 10% permanently. This provides extra liquidity for households, especially for constrained
home owners, and encourages consumption initially. At the same time, with a less strin-
gent collateral constraint, some low wage workers and tenants from the previous period buy
houses. Overall, however, relaxing the ￿nancing constraint has a very limited e⁄ect on hous-
ing price and aggregate production in the transition, a result similar to the comparisons of the
steady states, because the necessary adjustment is mostly achieved by the modest conversion
of rented to owned units rather than by the housing price. This contrasts Ortalo-Magne and
Rady (2006), who show that relaxing the collateral constraint increases the housing price
substantially by increasing the housing demand of credit constrained households. In their
model, the individual household faces discrete a choice of whether to live with parents, own
a ￿ at or a house of ￿xed size. Thus, relaxing the collateral constraint will generate a large
in￿ ow of new owners of ￿ ats and houses, which is not o⁄set by conversion from rented to
owned units.25 The welfare e⁄ects in our economy are also relatively modest even for the
25Also, in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), the net worth of home-owners with outstanding mortgage
33tenants: for the baseline economy, the welfare gains in the certainty expenditure equivalent
is 0.75% for the former tenant-worker and 1% for the tenant-retiree. Because there is virtu-
ally no indirect welfare e⁄ects through the redistribution of net worth, the welfare gain does
not exceed the maximum direct gains of switching from renting to owning a house: roughly
the utility loss from renting times the expenditure share of housing service (9% times 25%
= 2.25%) if the fraction of the expected lifetime enjoying homeownership rises from zero to
100%.
Putting together the simulation results from these experiments, we can conclude that, if
we were to explain the large increase in housing prices in many developed countries in the
last decades, we have to look for increases in the expected growth rate of labor productivity
and for decreases in the real interest rate. Suppose that the expected growth rate of labor
productivity rises from 2% to 3%. Then in the baseline economy, housing prices would
increase initially by 9% and the housing in￿ ation rate would afterwards increase from 0:22%
to 0:29% in terms of the consumption basket.26 In an economy with a larger share of land
(￿ = 0:5), the housing price would initially increase by 20%, and the real housing price
in￿ ation increases from 0:96% to 1:27%.
Suppose next that the world real rate of return on assets falls from 6:83% to 5:83%, in
addition to the above 1% increase in the growth rate of labor productivity. Then, in the
baseline economy, the housing price would increase initially by approximately 18%, followed
by an annual housing price in￿ ation of 0:29% in terms of the consumption basket. In the
economy with a larger share of land, the initial increase in the real housing price would
be 44%, followed by the real housing price in￿ ation of 1:27% annually. In 10 years, the
cumulative increase in housing prices in terms of the consumption basket would be about
21% in the baseline economy and would be 57% in the economy with the larger share of land.
Thus, if half the population lives and works in the area with the 50% land share and another
is sensitive to the housing price due to the leverage e⁄ect, which magni￿es the e⁄ect of any shock to
fundamentals, while there is no leverage e⁄ect in our equity ￿nancing economy. A comprehensive analysis
of leverage e⁄ect and the portfolio decision in the presence of uninsurable earnings and aggregate risk is a
topic for future research.
26Here we use equation(26) for computing the growth rate of housing price in the steady state.
34half lives and works in the area with the 10% land share, and labor does not move while
capital moves freely between the areas, then the cumulative housing price increase would be
roughly (21 + 57)=2 = 39% in terms of the consumption basket in 10 years. Of course, this
is a very crude calculation, ignoring how regional agglomeration takes place. Nonetheless,
it gives us some guidance that a signi￿cant fraction of the increase in real housing prices
may be explained by a combination of an increase in the growth rate of labor productivity,
a decrease in the real interest rate, and the fact that a large fraction of economic activity is
taking place in the area in which the share of land in property income is large.
6 Conclusions
This paper develops an aggregate life-cycle model to investigate the interaction between
housing prices, aggregate production, and household behavior over a lifetime. We take
into account land as a ￿xed factor for producing residential and commercial structures in
order to analyze the implications for the aggregate time series and the cross section of
household choices. Comparing two small open economies with di⁄erent shares of land in
the production of structure, the economy with a larger share of land has a higher housing
price-rental ratio and a lower homeownership rate in the steady state. The transitions of the
small open economy along the perfect foresight path illustrate that, where the share of land
is larger, once-for-all shocks to the growth rate of labor productivity or the world interest
rate generate a greater movement in housing prices. A permanent change in the collateral
constraint, however, has a limited impact on housing prices and aggregate production, even
though it a⁄ects the home-ownership rate substantially.
We also ￿nd that the permanent increase in the growth rate of labor productivity and the
decrease in the world real interest rate substantially redistribute wealth from the net buyers of
houses (relatively poor tenants) to the net sellers (relatively rich unconstrained homeowners)
with the house price hike. On average, households gain from the increase in the growth
rate of labor productivity and lose from the decrease in the world interest rate. Because
the welfare change gap between winners and losers in the housing market is substantial,
especially where land is more important for producing structures compared to capital, we
35think that a credible welfare evaluation should take into account household heterogeneity
and contract enforcement limitations in housing and credit markets that generate realistic
life-cycles of consumption and homeownership.
Appendix A: Solving the model
Solving the household￿ s decision problem
We discretize the net worth (xi
t) using 200 grid points, with denser grids closer to zero to
take into account the higher curvature of the value function in this region. The grid range
for the continuous state variable is veri￿ed ex-post by comparing it with the values obtained
in the simulations. For points which do not lie on state space grid, we evaluate the value
function using cubic spline interpolation along net worth. We simulate the idiosyncratic
exogenous productivity shock from its three-point distribution. The realizations of these
exogenous random variables are held constant when searching for the market clearing prices
(q and r). We use the policy functions to simulate the behavior of 10000 agents over 600 (the
exact number depends on the probability of exiting working life and the survival probability)
periods and aggregate the individual housing and equity demands to determine the market
clearing rental and housing price and the equilibrium household allocations.
Solving the perfect foresight model
We guess a sequence of structure rental rates frtg
T
t=1 such that the rental rate has con-
verged to the new steady state. For an exogenous real interest rate R in the small open
economy, use (21) to calculate a sequence of capital stocks and fraction of structures used in
production fKt;ftg
T
t=1 and then use (23) and (24) to compute the sequence of fYt;Vtg: Then
we get structure prices fqtg
T
t=1 from Vt = qtZt ￿It (which follows from the ￿ ow-of-funds and
zero pro￿t condition). Given these guessed prices, we solve the household￿ s problem back-
wards from period T when the economy is assumed to have converged to the new steady
state. Households are assumed to know the realization of the entire path of structure prices
and rental rates. The value function in period T is the value function for the new steady
state. Then the value function in period T-1 is computed as follows:
VT￿1 (xT￿1jrT￿1;qT￿1) = max
cT;hT
[u(cT￿1;hT￿1) + ￿VT (xTjrT;qT)]
We simulate the model forward, starting from the capital stock and the joint distribution
36of labor productivity and equity of the original steady state. In each period, we simulate a
cross-section of 10000 agents over 600 periods and aggregate their individual housing choices,
computing the excess demand for structures in each period. We increase the rental rate in
periods with an excess demand in the market for structures use, and decrease the rental rate
in periods with an excess supply, generating a new path frtg
T
t=1 of the rental rate. We repeat
this until successive paths of the rental rate are less than 0.0001% from each other.
AppendixB:StationaryRepresentationofValueFunc-
tions
The stationary representation of the household￿ s problem
Using the property of the steady state equilibrium of Section 2.4, we normalize the
quantities and prices using the power function of labor in e¢ ciency units N0
t ￿ AtNt and
population Nt. Both variables are exogenous state variables, and there can be a jump or a
kink in the trend if labor productivity experiences a once-for-all change in its level or growth
rate. Let us denote the normalized variable Xt as e Xt. Then we have:
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We also de￿ne the normalized discount factor as:







Let us assume population grows along the steady state path. Let e At be deviation of labor
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37Using these normalized variables, we can de￿ne the normalized value function. For an
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Appendix C: Data sources and de￿nitions
In order to compute the share of income of productive structures (￿); we use quarterly
data from the US Flow of Funds accounts and from the NIPA for the period of 1952 Q1 -
2005Q4. We follow Cooley and Prescott (1995).
We de￿ne unambiguous capital income as the sum of corporate pro￿ts (￿); net interest
(i); non-housing rental income (r) from the NIPA (table 1.12)27. We also measure the de-
preciation of capital (DEP) by the consumption of ￿xed capital (NIPA, table 1.14). We
allocate ￿ fraction of proprietors￿income (YP, NIPA, Table 1.12) to the income from pro-
ductive structures. Then, the income from productive structures, YZP; can be computed as
the sum of unambiguous capital income, depreciation, and ￿ fraction of Proprietors￿Income.
Because YZP = ￿Y , where Y is GDP excluding explicit and implicit rents from housing, we
have
￿ =
￿ + i + r + DEP
Y ￿ YP
27We use the average share of residential to total structures to compute non-housing rental income from
the total rental payments of all persons reported in NIPA table 1.12.
38This is a similar expression for the share of capital in output found in Cooley and Prescott
(1995, p.19).
Averaging the quarterly data for the U.S. from 1952 to 2005, we obtain a value of ￿ equal
to 0.26. This is lower than the share of capital in output in the real business cycle literature
(estimates there range between 0.3 and 0.4) because our ￿ excludes the capital intensive
production of housing services.
We can decompose economy-wide tangible assets between the household and the ￿rm.
The exact de￿nitions in the data and their counterparts in the theoretical model are given
in the following table:
Economic
concept
Flow of Funds concept
qZy
Non-farm, non-￿nancial tangible assets
(Non-residential structures+Equipment+software+Inventories)







Flow of funds, Table B.100
FL152010005.Q
Using these de￿nitions, we compute the average numbers of ZY=(ZY + H) = 0:47 be-
tween 1952:Q1 and 2005:Q4. The ratio of total tangible assets to GDP (q (Zy + H)=Y )
is 3.3. If farm corporate and non-corporate tangible assets (FL132010005.Q in the Flow of
Funds)28 are added to the non-farm tangible assets, then the ratio of household tangible
assets to total tangible assets falls from 0.47 to 0.44, while the ratio of total tangible assets
to GDP rises from 3.3 to 3.6.
28Thanks to Michael Palumbo (Board of Governors) of kindly sending us this series in private correspon-
dence.
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43FIGURE 1A: Policy functions for a low productivity worker
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Transition dynamics from a 1% increase in labour productivity growth 
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Transition dynamics from a 1% reduction in the world real interest rate 
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Notes to Table 5: Results from the closed economy with zero demand for domestic 
shares by the representative foreigner. In the baseline economy, the collateral 
constraint is denoted by θ and is equal to 0.3, gn denotes population growth and is 
equal to 1.01 (one percent per annum), ga=1.02 denotes a two percent annual 
productivity growth, and b=0.2 denotes a twenty percent gross replacement rate 
during retirement. The results from reducing γ from its baseline value of 0.9 to 0.5 are 
reported in column (6) labeled {γ=0.5, (6)}.  
baseline θ=0.1 θ=1.0 ga=1.03 b=0.1 γ=0.5
 Column 123 456
 % of tenants 25.16 2.95 37.48 25.16 5.07 10.30
 % of constrained households 8.34 25.71 10.94 8.56 4.65 8.50
 % of unconstrained homeowners 66.50 71.35 51.58 66.28 90.28 81.20
 % of housing used by tenants 8.69 0.57 13.17 8.67 1.34 2.45
 % of housing used by constrained 2.42 8.11 6.48 2.49 0.90 2.22
 % of shares owned by tenants 0.05 0.02 0.82 0.08 0.10 0.12
 % of shares owned by constrained 0.33 0.37 2.95 0.34 0.12 0.32
Current account as % of GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Net foreign Assets as % of GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Value of total structures to GDP 2.90 2.91 2.91 2.62 3.31 4.23
Housing structures to total structures 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.52
Value of housing to wages 2.57 2.46 2.46 2.27 2.72 4.16
Housing price to rental rate 8.45 8.46 8.48 7.70 9.54 11.08
Real return 6.83 6.81 6.79 8.40 5.90 9.20 
Table 6 
 
Notes to Table 6: Results from the small open economy with a given demand for 
domestic shares by a representative foreigner (world interest rate is 6.83% and γ=0.9). 
In the baseline economy, the collateral constraint is denoted by θ and is equal to 0.3, 
gn denotes population growth and is equal to 1.01 (one percent per annum), ga=1.02 
denotes a two percent annual productivity growth, and b=0.2 denotes a twenty percent 
gross replacement rate during retirement. R* is the world real return. γ=0.5 (column 
(8)) reports the results from setting γ equal to 0.5 at this given world interest rate. 
baseline θ=0.1 θ=1.0 ga=1.03 b=0.1 R*=5.83 γ=0.5
Column 123 45 6 7
 % of tenants 25.16 2.95 37.48 30.81 2.95 30.81 29.12
 % of constrained households 8.34 25.70 9.87 6.61 3.66 3.71 5.79
 % of unconstrained homeowners 66.50 71.36 52.65 62.58 93.39 65.48 65.09
 % of housing used by tenants 8.69 0.75 13.76 10.83 0.65 10.60 9.06
 % of housing used by constrained 2.42 8.10 5.69 2.68 0.69 1.33 1.70
 % of shares owned by tenants 0.05 0.10 0.89 0.20 0.02 -0.01 1.08
 % of shares owned by constrained 0.33 0.37 2.54 1.03 0.07 0.34 1.22
Current account as % of GDP 0.00 -0.07 -0.16 4.79 -4.18 3.56 13.05
Net foreign Assets as % of GDP 0.00 1.53 3.40 -124.34 86.37 -92.34 -251.26
Value of total structures to GDP 2.90 2.90 2.90 3.19 2.94 3.32 5.81
Housing structures to total structures 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.47
Value of housing to wages 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.68 2.68 2.78 4.82
Housing price to rental rate 8.45 8.45 8.45 9.35 8.45 9.65 15.71
Real return 6.83 6.83 6.83 6.83 6.83 5.83 6.83Table 7 
 
 
Notes to Table 7: Panel A reports the certainty expenditure equivalent changes (in 
percent) from shifts in the specified fundamentals relative to the baseline steady state 
in the small open economy (details of this computation are given in the text). In the 
baseline economy, the collateral constraint is denoted by θ and is equal to 0.3, gn 
denotes population growth and is equal to 1.01 (one percent per annum), ga=1.02 
denotes a two percent annual productivity growth, and b=0.2 denotes a twenty percent 
gross replacement rate during retirement. R* is the world real return. Panel B reports 
the Wealth Change (in percent) right after the unexpected change in the specified 
fundamentals for the same cases (details for these calculations are given in the text). 
Scarcity of Land Parameter γ=0.9 γ=0.5 γ=0.9 γ=0.5 γ=0.9 γ=0.5
Column 123 456
Panel A: Certainty expenditure equivalent ga+1% ga+1% R*-1% R*-1% b=0.15 b=0.1
Workers 9.69 8.14 -0.89 -0.21 -5.06 -4.16
Tenant Workers 9.67 7.33 -0.45 -1.22 -11.38 -10.51
Constrained Homeowner Workers 9.64 7.14 -1.45 -1.87 -8.23 -6.55
Unconstrained Homeowner Workers 10.21 9.12 -1.53 -0.33 -2.78 -1.68
Low Income Workers 9.60 7.30 -0.53 -1.14 -11.40 -10.75
Middle Income Workers 10.36 8.73 -1.19 -0.36 -4.65 -3.49
High Income Workers 9.73 9.36 -1.79 0.00 0.90 1.62
Retirees 7.56 8.45 0.00 3.47 -29.86 -26.90
Tenant Retirees 6.93 5.60 -0.30 -0.33 -43.79 -44.06
Constrained Homeowner Retirees 7.42 5.80 -0.05 0.15 -42.60 -40.73
Unconstrained Homeowner Retirees 8.61 9.38 0.79 4.53 -22.02 -18.77
Panel B: Wealth change
Workers 4.09 6.94 5.94 10.44 0.00 0.00
Tenant Workers -0.16 -0.97 1.51 0.58 0.03 0.25
Constrained Homeowner Workers 1.51 4.13 3.18 6.93 0.21 0.45
Unconstrained Homeowner Workers 6.53 10.96 8.12 15.39 0.47 0.47
Low Income Workers -0.15 -1.20 1.50 0.24 0.10 0.23
Middle Income Workers 5.81 9.54 7.23 13.77 0.42 0.58
High Income Workers 7.67 12.32 9.16 16.99 0.00 0.26
Retirees 5.66 9.92 7.22 14.25 0.00 0.00
Tenant Retirees 0.89 1.25 2.30 3.36 0.45 0.45
Constrained Homeowner Retirees 3.43 6.81 4.41 9.95 0.50 0.64
Unconstrained Homeowner Retirees 7.65 11.97 8.15 16.60 0.58 0.68www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma
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